面向数据库审计日志的抗量子门限签名方案

陈大江; 张奕文; 焦丽华; 汪白筝; 陈瑞东

doi:10.11999/JEIT251320

面向数据库审计日志的抗量子门限签名方案

doi: 10.11999/JEIT251320 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT251320

电子科技大学成都 610054

基金项目: 国家重点研发计划(No.2023YFB3106402)，四川省自然科学基金资助项目(No.2024NSFJQ0030, No.24NSFSC1771)

详细信息

作者简介:
陈大江：男，副教授，研究方向为数据安全、物联网安全、可信人工智能

张奕文：女，硕士生，研究方向为数据安全、物联网安全

焦丽华：女，硕士生，研究方向为数据安全、可信人工智能

汪白筝：男，硕士生，研究方向为数据安全、可信人工智能

陈瑞东：男，副研究员，研究方向为数据安全、可信人工智能

通讯作者:
陈瑞东　crdchen@163.com

中图分类号: TN918.1; TP309.7
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- 文章访问数: 20
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 修回日期: 2026-03-24
- 录用日期: 2026-03-24
- 网络出版日期: 2026-04-19

A Quantum-Resistant Threshold Signature Scheme for Database Audit Logs

University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 610054, China

Funds: National Key Research and Development Program of China (No. 2023YFB3106402), Natural Science Foundation of Sichuan Province (No. 2024NSFJQ0030, No. 24NSFSC1771)

摘要

摘要: 随着量子计算的迅猛发展，数据库审计日志中常用的RSA、ECDSA等经典数字签名机制因依赖大整数分解与离散对数等难题而在Shor算法下面临失效风险，同时Grover算法对哈希函数及对称密码的攻击复杂度降低也进一步削弱了现有审计机制的长期安全性。为提升审计日志在云计算与大数据环境中的完整性与可追溯能力，有必要构建能够抵御量子攻击的审计签名体系。为此，研究采用抗量子密码学原理，以FORS少次签名与XMSS-T树型结构为基础构建量子安全签名层，结合Shamir门限秘密共享机制实现私钥的安全分发与分布式管理，并利用链式哈希结构确保日志在存储与传输过程中的不可篡改性。安全性分析表明，该机制在量子随机预言机模型下满足不可伪造性与机密性要求，并具备抵御量子攻击的能力。实验结果进一步验证了体系在高并发日志场景下保持较低签名延迟与稳定吞吐率，且在不同日志规模与消息大小下表现出良好的扩展性，适用于大规模分布式数据库审计环境。
- 抗量子签名 /
- 数据库审计日志 /
- 门限秘密共享 /
- 数据安全
Abstract: Objective The rapid development of quantum computing has raised critical security concerns for current database audit-logging systems that still rely on classical public-key signature algorithms such as RSA and ECDSA. These schemes are vulnerable to Shor’s algorithm, which breaks integer-factorization- and discrete-logarithm-based cryptography in polynomial time. Grover’s algorithm further amplifies the risks by reducing the brute-force complexities of hash-based and symmetric primitives, undermining the long-term reliability of existing audit-log protection mechanisms in large-scale cloud and data-intensive infrastructures. Database audit logs serve as foundational evidence for ensuring data integrity, accountability, and traceability across distributed systems. Their security degradation under quantum-capable adversaries could impose severe operational, compliance, and forensic consequences. To address these challenges, this work aims to design a quantum-resistant audit-logging framework that simultaneously satisfies practical constraints on efficiency, real-time verification, scalable deployment, and distributed trust management. The objective is to provide a robust cryptographic foundation for next-generation database auditing systems capable of maintaining unforgeability and tamper-resistance against quantum threats.Methods To achieve these goals, the proposed framework integrates multiple post-quantum cryptographic primitives and distributed-security mechanisms. First, a hybrid hash-based signature layer is constructed by combining FORS and XMSS-T. FORS provides fast few-time signatures suitable for high-frequency log events, while XMSS-T organizes authentication paths in a Merkle-tree hierarchy to enable scalable state management. Their combination yields a high-security, multi-level quantum-resistant signing structure. Second, the design introduces a Shamir (r,n) threshold-sharing mechanism to decentralize the signing key into multiple fragments managed by independent audit agents. This avoids single points of failure, supports collaborative attestation workflows, and ensures that no individual party possesses complete signing authority. Third, a chained-hash structure is incorporated to bind consecutive log entries via one-way linkability, thereby providing strong tamper evidence and chronological integrity. Fourth, the framework defines a complete set of system algorithms—setup, key distribution, partial-signature generation, signature aggregation, log-chain update, and verification—that operate efficiently under distributed execution. To formally analyze security, the system is modeled under the quantum random-oracle model, and adversarial capabilities are described through UF-CMA, IND-CCA, and IND-CKA2 games, capturing quantum-capable forgery attempts, decryption misuse, and index indistinguishability attacks. A prototype implementation is developed and benchmarked on realistic multi-node settings to evaluate its performance across log scales, message sizes, interval configurations, and threshold ratios. Results and Discussions Experimental evaluations demonstrate that the proposed scheme achieves a favorable balance between quantum-resistant security and system performance. When handling large-scale logs, the average signing latency exhibits linear scalability with respect to log volume, validating the efficiency of the chain-hash structure (Table 2). Compared with traditional PQC signatures such as Dilithium and SPHINCS+, the integration of threshold signing reduces peak computational load on individual nodes while maintaining robust security guarantees. Performance tests further show that the proposed mechanism sustains a stable throughput of approximately 2,000 operations per second. The message-size sensitivity analysis indicates that latency grows linearly with log size, while remaining manageable even for messages exceeding 4 KB (Fig. 2b). Additionally, varying the threshold parameters ((r/n)) reveals a measurable but moderate impact on system latency; higher thresholds enhance security resistance against collusion at the cost of a slight delay increase (Fig. 2e). The interval-based chained signing strategy effectively reduces signature-generation frequency, thereby improving system throughput without sacrificing log-integrity guarantees. These results confirm that the proposed mechanism is well-suited for cloud and distributed database environments that demand real-time auditing and high-volume log processing. Conclusions This work presents a quantum-resistant database audit-logging mechanism that integrates hash-based signatures, threshold secret sharing, and chained log-integrity protection. The scheme provides strong security assurances in the post-quantum setting, including provable unforgeability, confidentiality, and tamper-resistance, supported by rigorous proofs in the QROM framework. Experimental results demonstrate that the mechanism maintains high signing and verification efficiency under large-scale deployment conditions, with excellent scalability across diverse log sizes, message lengths, and threshold configurations. Owing to its distributed trust model and future-proof cryptographic foundations, the proposed scheme provides a practical and secure solution for next-generation database audit systems in cloud computing, big-data analytics, and compliance-critical infrastructures.
- Post-quantum signature /
- Database audit logs /
- Threshold secret sharing /
- Data security

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图 1 系统工作流程图

下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片

图 2 本文方案与对比算法在不同条件下的性能结果对比

下载: 全尺寸图片幻灯片

表 1 系统符号表

符号	含义
$ {1}^{\lambda } $	安全参数(后量子安全)
$ p,q $	大质数 (Shamir 域和哈希/输出长度控制)
$ {Z}_{p} $	Shamir 多项式运算的有限域
$ G $	基于椭圆曲线的循环群,阶为 $ q $
$ P $	循环群生成元
msk	密钥管理中心(KMC)主私钥
mpk	KMC 主公钥 $ \text{mpk}=\alpha P $
$ \mathrm{s}{\mathrm{k}}_{\text{share,i}} $	签名参与方第 $ i $ 个私钥分片
$ \mathrm{p}{\mathrm{k}}_{\text{global}} $	系统全局公钥, 由 XMSS-T 签名 FORS 公钥生成
$ \text{LogChai}{\text{n}}_{i} $	日志链节点,包括 $ {d}_{i}、{h}_{i-1}、{t}_{i} $
$ {d}_{i} $	日志具体审计数据
$ {h}_{i} $	日志链哈希值
$ {t}_{i} $	日志时间戳
$ {\sigma }_{i} $	节点签名，由 FORS+XMSS-T 生成
$ {K}_{\text{enc}}{,K}_{\text{hash}} $	对称加密和索引哈希密钥
$ {H}_{1},{H}_{2},{H}_{3} $	抗碰撞哈希函数, 用于身份验证、加密、签名验证
PRF	伪随机函数, 用于生成 FORS 叶节点私钥

下载: 导出CSV

表 2 不同日志规模下的签名性能数据(消息大小:1 KB，签名对所有日志)

日志数	方案	签名数	平均延迟 (ms)	吞吐 (ops/s)	最大/最小延迟 (ms)	总耗时 (s)	标准差(ms)
10,000	ECDSA	10000	0.314	3,226	1.22/0.22	3.11	0.03
10,000	Dilithium	10000	0.392	2,564	1.10/0.30	3.90	0.05
10,000	SPHINCS+	10000	0.655	1,538	1.19/0.50	6.52	0.11
10,000	Our Scheme	10000	0.453	2,222	2.92/0.10	4.50	0.25
50,000	ECDSA	50000	0.310	3,226	1.55/0.24	15.56	0.04
50,000	Dilithium	50000	0.419	2,413	1.21/0.31	20.72	0.06
50,000	SPHINCS+	50000	0.706	1,429	6.04/0.51	35.23	0.12
50,000	Our Scheme	50000	0.484	2,083	3.20/0.11	24.16	0.30
100,000	ECDSA	100000	0.322	3,125	1.88/0.25	32.04	0.05
100,000	Dilithium	100000	0.431	2,326	12.10/0.31	43.80	0.08
100,000	SPHINCS+	100000	0.783	1,282	11.40/0.51	78.37	0.15
100,000	Our Scheme	100000	0.551	1,818	5.31/0.38	55.72	0.78
500,000	ECDSA	500000	0.339	2,941	5.33/0.25	170.82	0.13
500,000	Dilithium	500000	0.485	2,083	10.71/0.31	240.16	0.22
500,000	SPHINCS+	500000	0.848	1,176	15.81/0.52	425.19	0.41
500,000	Our Scheme	500000	0.756	1,333	30.09/0.10	375.19	2.49
1,000,000	ECDSA	1000000	0.361	2,777	12.11/0.26	360.26	0.16
1,000,000	Dilithium	1000000	0.520	1,923	16.32/0.31	520.75	0.28
1,000,000	SPHINCS+	1000000	0.857	1,176	20.78/0.51	850.02	0.62
1,000,000	Our Scheme	1000000	0.952	1,053	52.45/0.10	950.42	4.98

下载: 导出CSV

表 3 本方案在不同消息大小下的性能对比(日志数量 =10 万条)

消息大小	平均延迟 (ms)	吞吐率(ops/s)	总时间 (s)	最大/最小延迟 (ms)	标准差 (ms)
0.5 KB	0.522	1,923	52.13	3.40/0.35	0.83
1.0 KB	0.551	1,818	55.72	5.31/0.38	0.78
2.0 KB	0.619	1,667	60.98	10.47/0.43	0.91
4.0 KB	0.750	1,333	75.43	12.61/0.55	2.54
8.0 KB	0.824	1,220	82.41	15.48/0.60	3.17
16.0 KB	0.956	1,053	95.56	20.06/0.75	5.42

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