针对完整性攻击的信息物理系统双通道联合编码检测

莫小磊; 曾维鑫; 富佳伟; 窦克勤; 王言伟; 孙希明; 林思达; 隋天举

doi:10.11999/JEIT250729

针对完整性攻击的信息物理系统双通道联合编码检测

doi: 10.11999/JEIT250729 cstr: 32379.14.JEIT250729

1.
大连理工大学控制科学与工程学院大连 116024
2.
中国航空工业集团公司沈阳飞机设计研究所沈阳 110035
3.
国家工业信息安全发展研究中心北京 100040
4.
大连海事大学理学院大连 116026

基金项目: 国家自然科学基金(62322306, 62173057)，航空科学基金(2022Z018063001)，国防科工局基础科研计划(JCKY2023110C080)，大连理工大学重大项目科研专题(DUT24ZD412)

详细信息

作者简介:
莫小磊：男，硕士生，研究方向为信息物理系统攻击检测、安全状态估计

曾维鑫：男，硕士生，研究方向为信息物理系统攻击检测、安全状态估计

富佳伟：男，博士，高级工程师，研究方向为飞机总体设计

窦克勤：男，博士生，研究员，研究方向为工业信息安全

王言伟：男，博士生，教授级高级工程师，研究方向为飞机总体设计、机载智能信息系统

孙希明：男，博士，教授，研究方向为切换系统控制、工业网络智能控制与优化

林思达：男，博士，副教授，研究方向为网络化控制系统优化

隋天举：男，博士，教授，研究方向为系统安全防护和故障诊断、工业互联网和网络化控制系统

通讯作者:
富佳伟　fjw15210591734@163.com

中图分类号: TN918.1; TP13; TP309
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2025-08-07
- 修回日期: 2025-11-11
- 录用日期: 2025-11-12
- 网络出版日期: 2025-11-17
- 刊出日期: 2026-04-10

Two-Channel Joint Coding Detection for Cyber-Physical Systems Against Integrity Attacks

1.
School of Control Science and Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China
2.
AVIC Shenyang Aircraft Design and Research Institute, Shenyang 110035, China
3.
China Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team, Beijing 100040, China
4.
School of Science, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China

Funds: The National Natural Science Foundation of China (62322306, 62173057), The Aeronautical Science Foundation of China (2022Z018063001), The KGJ Basic Research and Development Program (JCKY2023110C080), Dalian University of Technology Major Project Research Topics (DUT24ZD412)

摘要

摘要: 信息物理系统(CPS)完整性攻击针对系统数据流发起攻击，破坏输入输出数据一致性，由于其攻击方式多变、隐蔽性强的特性，较其他CPS攻击在检测及防护上更为困难。为此，该文提出一种控制-输出双通道的数据加性-乘性联合编码检测方案，旨在检测完整性攻击并在3种典型攻击上进行验证，包括控制通道偏置攻击、输出通道重放攻击以及双通道隐蔽攻击。完整性攻击通过部分或全面系统信息的获取及掌控可使卡方检测器检测值小于阈值，从而实现对CPS系统“隐形”。为此，该文方案创新性地在通道两侧布置加性正负水印对以及乘性编码/解码矩阵对，未知信号及部件的引入为攻击者带来了信息不确定性，使残差统计特性偏离其期望数值。此外，水印对与矩阵对之间通过不同机制实现了解耦，其正负或互逆形式使得无攻击时不影响系统的控制性能，并且以时变形式防止攻击者对其重构。最后，通过计算推导出引入该文方案后3种攻击前后残差统计特性的变化，并以飞行器飞行轨迹仿真为例，说明方案的有效性和先进性。
- 信息物理系统 /
- 完整性攻击 /
- 物理水印 /
- 编码矩阵
Abstract: Objective Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are widely applied across infrastructure, aviation, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, and transportation, as computing, control, and sensing technologies advance. Due to the real-time interaction between information and physical processes, such systems are exposed to security risks during data exchange. Attacks on CPS can be grouped into availability, integrity, and reliability attacks based on information security properties. Integrity attacks manipulate data streams to disrupt the consistency between system inputs and outputs. Compared with the other two types, integrity attacks are more difficult to detect because of their covert and dynamic nature. Existing detection strategies generally modify control signals, sensing signals, or system models. Although these approaches can detect specific categories of attacks, they may reduce control performance and increase model complexity and response delay. Methods A joint additive and multiplicative coding detection scheme for the two-channel structure of control and output is proposed. Three representative integrity attacks are tested, including a control-channel bias attack, an output-channel replay attack, and a two-channel covert attack. These attacks remain stealthy by partially or fully obtaining system information and manipulating data so the residual-based χ2 detector output stays below the detection threshold. The proposed method introduces paired additive watermarking signals with positive and negative patterns, together with paired multiplicative coding and decoding matrices on both channels. These additional unknown signals and parameters introduce information uncertainty to the attacker and cause the residual statistics to deviate from the expected values constructed using known system information. The watermarking pairs and matrix pairs operate through different mechanisms. One uses opposite-sign injection, while the other uses a mutually inverse transformation. Therefore, normal control performance is maintained when no attack is present. The time-varying structure also prevents attackers from reconstructing or bypassing the detection mechanism. Results and Discussions Simulation experiments on an aerial vehicle trajectory model are conducted to assess both the influence of integrity attacks on flight paths and the effectiveness of the proposed detection scheme. The trajectory is modeled using Newton’s equations of motion, and attitude dynamics and rotational motion are omitted to focus on positional behavior. Detection performance with and without the proposed method is compared under the three attack scenarios (Fig. 2, Fig. 3, Fig. 4). The results show that the proposed scheme enables effective identification of all attack types and maintains stable system behavior, demonstrating its practical applicability and improvement over existing approaches. Conclusions This study addresses the detection of integrity attacks in CPS. Three representative attack types (bias, replay, and covert attacks) are modeled, and the conditions required for their successful execution are analyzed. A detection approach combining additive watermarking and multiplicative encoding matrices is proposed and shown to detect all three attack types. The design uses paired positive-negative additive watermarks and paired encoding and decoding matrices to ensure accurate detection while maintaining normal control performance. A time-varying configuration is adopted to prevent attackers from reconstructing or bypassing the detection elements. Using an aerial vehicle trajectory simulation, the proposed approach is demonstrated to be effective and applicable to cyber-physical system security enhancement.
- Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) /
- Integrity attacks /
- Physical watermarking /
- Coding matrices

HTML全文

图 1 针对完整性攻击的综合检测方案

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图 2 偏置攻击检测结果对比

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图 3 重放攻击检测结果对比

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图 4 隐蔽攻击检测结果对比

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